From 1990 to 1993, an outbreak of respiratory Acinetobacter baumannii infection occurred in five intensive care units (lCUs) of a tertiary care center. A. baumannii was subsequently isolated from disinfected temperature probes and ventilator circuits. Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis suggested that a single strain accounted for 93% of patient isolates and 88% of environmental isolates. Univariate risk factors for A. baumannii acquisition were tracheostomy (P < .01), ventilation >3 days (P < .01), dialysis (P = .03), Stenotrophomonas maltophilia respiratory colonization (P = .02), parenteral nutrition (P = .05), and enteric feeding (P < .01). Logistic regression analysis showed duration of ventilation and enteric feeding to be independent risk factors. The outbreak strain was relatively antibiotic-susceptible, but the mortality attributable to respiratory A. baumannii acquisition was 23%. Only the APACHE II score was independently associated with increased mortality. Multifaceted control measures, including gas sterilization of temperature probes, terminated the outbreak.
and Western divisions. There are five ICUs at one site and two at the other. The outbreak investigation involved the five ICUs from the first site only, which consist of two cardiovascular surgery IClls (9 and 12 beds), one coronary ICU (12 beds), one medical ICU (8 beds), and one surgical ICU (16 beds) . Surveillance cultures of respiratory secretions were not routinely done on admission to the hospital or the ICUs. Before the investigation, all microbiologic sampling of the respiratory tract was based on clinical suspicion of infection.
Definitions and case identification. In the summer of 1993, an apparent increase in the rate of A. baumannii isolation from ICU respiratory specimens was noted, and microbiology laboratory records were reviewed to establish rates over the preceding 5 years. A case was defined as isolation of A. baumannii from a respiratory specimen obtained after a patient's ICU stay of at least 72 h or within 48 h of transfer from an ICU. A respiratory specimen was defined as a sputum sample, endotracheal aspirate, bronchoalveolar lavage (BAL) sample, or protected specimen bronchial brushing (PBB).
Cases were classified as having definite pneumonia, as having probable pneumonia, or as being colonized, using a modification of previously published definitions of nosocomial pneumonia [27] . Greater weight was given to specimens obtained via BAL or PBB, reflecting the enhanced predictive value of these invasive techniques in the diagnosis of ventilator-associated pneumonia [28, 29] . BAL and PBB specimens were not cultured in a quantitative fashion. Cases were classified as being definite pneumonia if A. baumannii was isolated by BAL or PBB and either the chest radiograph demonstrated a new infiltrate within 48 h of the culture or the patient had 2 ofthe 3 following parameters: leukocytosis (white blood cell count~12,OOO/mm 3 ) , fever (~38.3°C, oral or tympanic), or purulent sputum (~25 white blood cells/high-power field). If the specimen was an endotracheal aspirate or sputum sample, all four criteria were required.
Probable pneumonia was defined as either a positive BAL or PBB specimen and one of the parameters of fever, leukocytosis, or purulent sputum. Alternatively, probable pneumonia was de-fined by a positive endotracheal aspirate or sputum sample and three of the four parameters of fever, leukocytosis, purulent sputum, or an abnormal chest radiograph that was considered a new finding. If criteria for pneumonia were not fulfilled, cases were classified as colonized.
Respiratory equipment processing. All policies regarding the handling, transport, and disinfection of ICU respiratory equipment were reviewed in detail, and actual practice patterns in these areas were directly observed where possible. Protocol guidelines dictated that all ventilator tubing circuits, sputum traps, and connectors be changed after no more than 48 h of use by any 1 patient. Circuit condensate collecting in water traps was emptied as necessary into the bedside sink or garbage bin. Circuits were dismantled and bagged in the Respiratory Therapy department. Before transport from the ICU to the Respiratory Therapy department, it was observed that circuits were emptied into and temporarily stored in the bedside sinks. Circuit components were then transported to the Sterile Processing and Distribution (SPD) area of the hospital. Here they were rinsed, pasteurized at 75°C for 30 min, air-dried, and repackaged into sealed plastic bags for transport back to the Respiratory Therapy department. Circuit components were then stored until reassembled for use.
Temperature probes (900MR402; Fisher and Paykel, Auckland, New Zealand) were inserted into the ventilator circuit tubing just proximal to the bifurcation into inspiratory and expiratory components, with the probe tip penetrating the internal surface of the tubing. Probes were cleaned with 70% isopropyl alcohol or 0.5% chlorhexidine in 70% isopropyl alcohol for a duration of no greater than 60 s at the time of circuit changes and between patients. Enteric feeding bags and connecting tubing were replaced every 24 h. The only source of enteric feeding formula was new cans. There was no formula reservoir common to multiple patients. Unused formula was refrigerated and discarded after 24 h. Fresh formula was connected to patient tubing every 4 h, and according to the ICU protocol, the tubing was flushed with sterile water after each feeding.
Microbiologic survey. The outbreak investigation involved microbiologic sampling of environmental and clinical sites, with a focus on the use of respiratory equipment or the processing of respiratory equipment, since the initial data suggested a potential respiratory source. Environmental sites were selected for sampling on the basis of either experience from previously described A. baumannii outbreaks (manual ventilation bags, ventilator circuit tubing and sputum traps, Wright respirometers, oxygen analyzers, low-pressure alarms, staff hands, and expelled ventilator air) [14] [15] [16] 27, [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] or on perceived weaknesses observed during respiratory equipment dismantling and processing procedures (temperature probes, sink faucets and drains, and surfaces in the SPD and bronchoscopy suites). Ventilator circuit components sampled were randomly selected from those disinfected and awaiting patient use. Cultures were taken using cotton-tipped swabs moistened with sterile brain-heart infusion (BHI) broth with 1% Tween 80 (OxoidUnipath, Basingstoke, UK) and plated directly onto MacConkey agar. In addition, quantitative cultures were taken from pasteurized humidifiers, water traps, manual ventilation bags, ventilator tubing, and expelled ventilator air.
Respiratory equipment was sampled by thoroughly rinsing with 10 mL of sterile BHI broth and doing serial quantitative dilutions to 10-4
• Ventilator tubing was sampled by agitating 50 mL of broth within the tubing for 30 s using the broth-washout method [36] ; this broth was then serially diluted to 10-4 for culture. Expelled ventilator air was sampled using a modified tube-broth technique [37] , in which air from ventilators was directed at preset ventilator parameters (15 cycles; volume, 2000 mL; rate, 25 breaths/min; flow rate, 80 L/min) over the surface of sterile BHI broth, which was then centrifuged and the sediment plated directly onto MacConkey agar.
During the outbreak investigation, individual respiratory specimens for culture were collected by ICU staff as clinically indicated. In addition, two point-prevalence surveys were done in the surgical ICU, during which respiratory specimens were obtained from all patients. Surveillance rectal swabs were taken during one of the surveys. Conventional and quantitative culturing of ventilator equipment in use during these surveys involved direct sampling of condensate from water traps and humidifiers, broth-washout sampling of ventilator tubing condensate, tube-broth sampling of inspired air, and agitation of temperature probes in sterile BHI broth. Quantitative cultures of the equipment in use were done using dilutions up to 10-7 , which were inoculated onto MacConkey agar.
A single survey of hands in one ICU was conducted during the course of the investigations in an effort to assess the potential of hand carriage, given the multiple manipulations of circuit condensate water traps and the methods of dismantling respiratory circuits. Hand cultures were obtained from medical, nursing, and paramedical personnel by having them place the dominant hand up to the wrist in an open sterile plastic bag containing 100 mL of BHI broth with 1% Tween 80. The dominant hand was then agitated against the nondominant hand in a "scrubbing" motion for 30 s. Cotton-tipped swabs were used to obtain culture samples from under rings on the nondominant hand.
Bacterial identification and susceptibility. All clinical respiratory specimens were plated onto blood and MacConkey agar. A. baumannii identification and antibiotic susceptibility were determined using the Neg-Combo type 15 panel and the MicroScan Walk-away 96 System (both, Baxter Diagnostics, Mississauga, Canada). Antibiotic susceptibilities included on this panel include ampicillin, trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole (TMP-SMZ), imipenem, ticarcillin, piperacillin, ciprofloxacin, cefazolin, cefuroxime, cefotaxime, ceftazidime, cefoxitin, amikacin, gentamicin, tobramycin, and nitrofurantoin. All isolates identified as A. baumannii were confirmed by growth at 44°C [38] . Environmental specimens and hand cultures were plated onto MacConkey agar alone and screened for any cytochrome oxidase-negative glucosenonfermenting (by triple-sugar iron agar slopes) gram-negative bacilli. These isolates were then confirmed as A. baumannii as described above.
Macrorestriction analysis by pulsed-jield gel electrophoresis (PFGE). Strain relatedness was assessed by examining the chromosomal DNA macrorestriction patterns obtained with the lowfrequency cleavage endonucleases Sftl and Smai: DNA isolation, deproteinization, and enzyme restriction were done using previously described methods [39, 40] , with minor modifications. Purified DNA plugs were digested with 50 U of Sftl (New England Biolabs, Beverly, MA) or Smal (Boehringer Mannheim, Laval, Canada) as directed by the manufacturer. Molten inserts were loaded into a 1% pulsed-field certified agarose gel (Bio-Rad Laboratories, Mississauga, Canada) and run on a CHEF-DR II apparatus (Bio-Rad) at 200 V and 12°C. Sftl gels were ramped from 5 to 35 s for 20 hand Smal gels for 22 h. Gels were then stained with ethidium bromide and photographed. Strains were considered concordant if they differed by~3 bands [40, 41] . The ATCC 19606 reference strain was included as a control.
Case-control analysis. A case-control analysis was done to identify risk factors for A. baumannii acquisition and to assess the effect of acquisition on clinical end points and mortality. A 4-month period (April through July 1993) before the implementation of any control measures was selected for analysis. Case-patients were matched with controls on the basis of severity of illness at admission to specifically assess the impact of A. baumannii acquisition on subsequent morbidity and mortality. Each case was matched with a single control from the same ICU on the basis of concordance of admission APACHE II score [42] within 5 points. APACHE II scores were calculated by the surgical ICU staff on admission, and scores from other ICUs were calculated retrospectively by investigators. Control patients had been admitted within 1 month of the cases' positive cultures. When several controls could be matched to a case, the control temporally closest to the positive case culture was selected.
In total, 20 variables were analyzed as potentially associated with A. baumannii acquisition, most of which had been identified as risk factors in previous studies. These included tracheostomy [43] ; the prior use of broad-spectrum antibiotics, including thirdgeneration cephalosporins [16] , clindamycin [44] , and imipenem [24] ; in-line nebulizer use [45] ; prior gastrointestinal surgery [43] ; total parenteral nutrition [16] ; presence and duration of preceding mechanical ventilation [25, 40, 43] ; presence of a central venous catheter [16] ; and death [25] . Other variables selected were the prior isolation of Stenotrophomonas (previously Xanthomonas [46] ) maltophilia, previous solid-organ transplantation, hemodialysis or ultrafiltration, patient transfer from an outside hospital, A. baumannii respiratory colonization of a previous roommate, number of prior roommates, enteral feeding, and presence of a nasogastric tube.
Statistical analysis. Univariate analysis was done using the Epi Info 6.02 (CDC, Atlanta) software package, with P~.05 considered significant. Dichotomous variables were analyzed using Fisher's exact test and continuous variables using Student's t test (for normally distributed variables) or the Wilcoxon rank sum test. Unconditional stepwise logistic regression was done with Egret (Statistics and Epidemiology Research, Seattle), using a model that incorporated variables from univariate analysis that were associated with P~.05.
Results
Rates of A. baumannii respiratory acquisition. Between 1990 and 1993, the crude rates of respiratory A. baumannii isolation within the five ICUs increased from 1.6 to 13.4 isolates/month (figure 1). Data concerning patient discharge rates were available for the surgical ICU. They had been stable over this period (59.1 discharges/month in 1990, 60.5 discharges/ month in 1993), while the rate of respiratory A. baumannii isolation per 1000 patient discharges had increased from 14.1 to 108.6. The ICUs accounted for 92% of all hospital A. baumannii isolates in 1993, representing a total of 121 cases of nosocomial acquisition of this organism within the first 9 months of 1993, compared with 19 during all of 1990.
Microbiologic survey. In total, 200 environmental samples were cultured. A. baumannii was not isolated from any site in the SPD or bronchoscopy suites. A. baumannii was not found on any of the disinfected manual ventilation bags (5), ventilator tubing (10), humidifiers (19) , oxygen analyzers (4), Wright respirometers (3), or low-pressure alarms (3). A. baumannii was found on 1 (9%) of 11 disinfected temperature probes and I (1%) of 95 pasteurized ventilator circuit components (a water trap). A. baumannii was also isolated from several sites not subject to any disinfection, including 7 (70%) of 10 ICU sink drains and 1 (12.5%) of 8 ventilator exhalation filters (on the distal or "patient" side). The hand survey identified that 8 (23%) of 35 staff carried A. baumannii on their hands.
During the two patient prevalence surveys, A. baumannii was found in the respiratory tracts of 10 (43.5%) of23 patients. Rectal swabs were positive in 1 (8%) of 12 patients and were not positive in any case with a negative respiratory culture. Ventilator circuits were thoroughly sampled at multiple points during the second survey only (August 1993). In this survey, 3 (27%) of 11 patients had respiratory specimens positive for A. baumannii, and all had the same A. baumannii strain cultured from their ventilator circuits. Respiratory cultures were negative for the remaining 8 of 11 patients, yet 5 (62.5%) of these 8 ventilator circuits were colonized with A. baumannii. Quantitative cultures showed colony counts up to 6.0 X 10 6 /L in the water traps of these circuits. Follow-up respiratory cultures were available for 4 of these 5 patients, and within 4 days, 3 of these 4 became colonized with A. baumannii. One patient remained persistently culture-negative. The single patient for whom no follow-up cultures were available had been in the ICU only "-'12 h for postoperative monitoring. A surveillance sputum was A. baumannii-negative, but quantitative culturing ofthe temperature probe from this circuit yielded colony counts of 6 X 10 3/mL.
Antibiotic susceptibility patterns. All isolates were tested for antibiotic susceptibility. In cases in which multiple isolates with the same antibiogram originated from the same patient or circuit, a single representative isolate was selected for analysis by both antibiogram and PFGE. One hundred A. baumannii isolates collected over the 4-month period during the outbreak investigation were chosen as a representative sample and assessed for strain relatedness using both techniques. Thirty-nine isolates originated from ICU clinical specimens (respiratory or blood) and 34 from the environmental and hand surveys. In addition, 12 isolates from inpatient wards at the outbreak site and 15 isolates from inpatient wards at a site apparently unaffected by the outbreak were also selected for comparison purposes.
Antibiogram comparison identified 8 distinct patterns among the isolates. The antibiotic susceptibilities (for all 100 A. baumannii isolates) were TMP/SMZ, 88%; ciprofloxacin, 85%; cefuroxime, 39%; ceftazidime, 79%; and gentamicin, 79%. All isolates tested were sensitive to imipenem. Considering only isolates belonging to the outbreak strain, as determined by PFGE analysis (73 in total), susceptibilities were TMP/SMZ, 
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99%; ciprofloxacin, 96%; cefuroxime, 51% ; ceftazidime, 96%; and gentamicin, 93%. Using resistance to these 5 antibiotics as the criterion for high-level antibiotic resistance, 13 (48%) of27 isol ates not belonging to the outbreak strain demonstrated high-level antibiotic resistance, compared with I (1.5%) of 73 of those belonging to the outbreak strain. Macrorestriction analysis. PFGE analysis delineated 18 distinct profiles, with :;;fil digestion providing superior band resolution. A single A. baumannii strain accounted for the majority of the isolates during the period of study: 29 (93.5%) of 31 respiratory isolates from the ICUs were concordant by PFGE, and 29 (88%) of 33 environmental and hand isolates showed the same pattern (figure 2) . Only 1 (8%) of 12 inpatient ward isolates showed this PFGE pattern. Of 15 isolates from the other hospital site, apparently unaffected by the outbreak, 3 (20%) were concordant with the outbreak strain . While transfer of patients between the two hospital sites was not uncommon, these isolates originated from 2 lCU patients, neither of whom had ever been hospitalized at the outbreak site. However, personnel also frequently moved between the two sites . For isolates c1assificd on the basis ofPFGE concordance as belonging to the outbreak strain, 23 (79%) of 29 clinical and 27 (93%) of 29 environmental or hand isolates were concordant by antibiogram. The ATCC strain was clearly distinct.
Case-control analysis. Forty-nine cases were identified during April through July 1993. Incomplete records prevented calculation of the APACHE II score for 1 case, so 48 cases were matched with controls. The mean APACHE 11 score was 20. Demographic characteristics of the 2 groups arc shown in table I. Sixty-eight patients (71 %) were postoperative. The rate of isolation of other potential respiratory pathogens, both bacterial and fungal, did not differ between cases and controls.
Six variables were associated with respiratory A. baumannii acquisition on univariate analysis (table 2): tracheostomy (P = .006), ventilation for > 3 days (P~.00 I) , total parenteral nutrition (P = .05), dialysis (P = .03), S. maltophilia colonization (P = .02), and enteric feeding (P~.00 I). Stepwise logistic regression analysis identified only duration of ventilation and enteric feeding as independently associated with A. baumannii acquisition (odds ratio [OR], l.l ; 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.05-1.2; and OR,S.!; 95% CI, 1.6-16.2, respectively). The prior use of antibiotics was not associated with A. baumannii acquisition. All case-patients and controls were given at least one antibiotic prior to or during their ICU stay .
Overall mortality was 34% (33/96). Cases had a significantly higher mortality rate than matched controls (46% vs. 23%, P = .01). The attributable mortality due to A. baumannii acquisition was therefore 23% . APACHE II scores were significantly imipenem use (P = .045), and transfer from another hospital (P = .03). Only the APACHE II score was independently associated with an increased mortal ity risk in logistic regression analysis.
Sixteen cases (33%) were classified as colonized, 10 (21%) with possible pneumonia and 22 (46%) with definite pneumonia. There was a stepwise increase in mortality between controls (23%), colonized cases (31%) , and cases with possible or definite pneumonia (53% , P = .02; figure 3) .
Control measures. Initial control measures were implemented in September 1993, including hand washing before and after contact with patients or ventilator circuits, cohorting of A. baumannii-coosuiv« patients within the ICUs, a distinct separation between clean and dirty areas in the Respiratory Therapy department, and an end to the practice of emptying ventilator circuit condensate into the ICU sinks. There was no immediate decrease in respiratory A . baumannii isolation rates, but the education and training of all staff and full implementation of these measures took place over 1-2 weeks. In late September, high-level (ethylene oxide) disinfection oftemperature probes was initiated; by the end of October 1993 (figure 4), the rate of respiratory A. baumannii isolation had fallen from a peak of 13.4 isolates/month to 1.7/month (baseline rate in 1990 had been 1.6 isolates/month). This reduced rate has been maintained for at least 18 months following the outbreak.
Discussion
Early reports suggested that A. baumannii was responsible for little clinical disease [9, II, 12] , and some recent studies NOTE . NA , not applicable.
• Maximum likelihood estimate of odds ratio with 95% confidence intervals. have suggested an associated morbidity as low as 1% [10] . However, other investigators report higher rates of clinical disease, particularly in association with strains demonstrating high-level antimicrobial resistance [16, 23 -26] . Our outbreak investigation shows A. baumannii to be a significant respiratory pathogen, even when susceptible to a broad range of antibiotics and treated appropriately. Only a minority of our cases were classified as colonized, with two-thirds having possible or definite pneumonia. Whether colonized or infected, case mortality was higher than in matched ICU controls. There are several possible explanations for the observed discrepancy in mortality rates. A. baumannii may preferentially colonize critically ill patients, who would be expected to have a higher mortality rate, leading to a factitious increase in mortality. In our case-control analysis, we attempted to minimize this potential bias by matching cases and controls by APACHE II scores at ICU admission. The admission APACHE II score has been shown to correlate with the subsequent risk of inhospital death [42, 47] , so patients matched in this fashion would be expected to have a similar mortality. Another possible explanation is that A. baumannii acquisition is a marker for long-term mechanical ventilation. Since a more severe illness may also prolong mechanical ventilation, A. baumannii acquisition may simply be a marker for severity of illness. While this could explain the increased mortality in cases compared with controls, it does not explain the increased mortality demonstrated by infected cases compared with colonized cases. This observation strongly suggests an association between respiratory A. baumannii acquisition and death.
Previous outbreak investigations have identified multiple risk factors for A. baumannii acquisition, several of which were found in this outbreak. These include mechanical ventilation, [16, 25, 43] , parenteral nutrition [16] , and central venous catheterization [16] . Our analysis identified two novel risk factors: colonization with Stenotrophomonas maltophilia and enteric feeding. Since S. maltophilia and A. baumannii are both waterloving organisms, infections by either bacterium might be dependent on the same deficiencies in equipment disinfection and infection-control procedures. Indeed, S. maltophilia did not independently predict A. baumannii acquisition.
Enteral feeding, however, was independently associated with A. baumannii acquisition. Patient-to-patient transmission on the hands of medical staff in frequent contact with feeding tubes is a possible mechanism. If this were the case, then one would expect that the presence of an A. baumannii-positive roommate to increase the risk of bacterial acquisition, but our findings do not support this hypothesis. It seems unlikely that feeding tubes would have become contaminated with A. baumannii through the practice of flushing tubes with tap water from the ICU sinks, since no sampled faucets harbored the bacteria. However, with >70% of the sampled ICU sink drains contaminated with A. baumannii (likely due to the practice of emptying ventilator circuit condensate into sinks), with the finding of A. baumannii on the hands of 23% of the personnel in a single prevalence survey, and with the high-density A. baumannii colonization (,,-, 10 7 cfu/mL) of condensate within the water traps, it is possible that inadequate hand washing after the emptying of condensate or manipulations of the circuit followe d by manipulations of the feeding tube may have facilitated pharyngeal and respiratory tract colonization with A. baumannii. However, this is only conjecture, and without supporting evidence, the striking association of A. baumannii acquisition with enteral feeding remains essentially unexplained by our investigations.
The prior use of broad-spectrum antibiotics has been associated with A. baumannii acqui sition in past outbreaks [16, 40] . Thi s was not our experience, possibly because of the relati ve antimicrobial susceptibility of the outbreak strain, which may have prevent ed selection by these broad-spectrum agent s. Given the sensitivity of the A. baumannii to antibiotics commonly used in our ICUs , it is difficult to explain the 23% attributable mortality. Although cases and control s were matched for severity of illne ss, given the complexities of the underly ing diseases and their management in this patient population, it is possible oth er unrecognized factors contributed to the mortality observed. Nonetheless, given the fact that all but I patient with clinical A. baumannii infection received appropriate antibiotics, the striking increase in mortality over matched ICU control s serves to emphasize the path ogenicity of even a relatively antibiotic-sensitive strain in this setting.
A. baumann ii outbreaks have been associated with various environmental reservoirs . The se often cons ist of inadequately disinfect ed respiratory equipment, including pressure transducers [44] , Wright respirometers [15, 30] , humidifiers [14] , oxygen and temperature probes [33] , ventilator tubing [27] , and even venti lators them selves [43] . Microbiologic evidence in our A. baumannii outbreak implicated inadequately disinfected (alcohol-wiped) temperature probe s and , to a lesser extent , pasteurized ventilator equipment as the reservoirs. This is particularly we ll demonstrat ed by I patient , who was transientl y ventilated postoperatively and whose temperature probe and ventilato r circuit were heavil y colon ized with A. baumannii despite negati ve respiratory cultures.
The dram atic increase in quantitative A. baumannii hand cultures after handling ventilator circuitry and 23% carriage rates on ICU staff hands demonstrate the critical importance of careful hand washing. Pasteurization is usually adequate to sterilize ventilator circuitry but cannot overcome a high burden of bacteria [48] . It is therefore important to prerinse equipment with a visible biofilm and to not pack equipment too tightly in the pasteurizer. Outbreaks have also been described due to pasteurizer malfunction [14] , with water temperatures not reaching required levels due to faulty temperature sensors. This was not the case in our outbreak but does emphasize the need for routine calibration of temperature sensors.
As has been the experience in other centers [13] , delayed detection of this A. baumannii outbreak may be attributed at least partially to the lack of prospective surveillance of respiratory A. baumannii isolates. The risk of delayed detection of outbreaks caused by unusual pathogens or involving unusual sites is inherent to the targeting of surveillance programs to certain pathogens or sites. This targeting, in turn, is largely due to the increasing financial constraints imposed on infection control departments.
Prior studies have highlighted illness due to multidrug-resistant A. baumannii, and it is in this setting that this organism has earned a reputation as a significant nosocomial pathogen. This investigation demonstrates that broadly antibiotic-sensitive A. baumannii strains may also be associated with substantial morbidity and mortality in an outbreak. Control of this outbreak appeared to coincide with the implementation of highlevel sterilization for temperature probes, suggesting that inadequately sterilized probes were an important reservoir. However, it is likely that a combination of hand washing, education, and revision of ICU infection-control policies in several key areas also contributed to its prompt termination. Our investigation emphasizes that policies concerning the processing and disinfection of respiratory equipment should be reviewed on a regular basis. The newly drafted pneumonia prevention guidelines [49] may prove a valuable tool in this process. However, observations of actual staff practices may also be necessary to ensure compliance.
